David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 68 (August):275-307 (1986)
A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework to experience. Much contemporary debate on the nature of conceptual change is a direct outgrowth of this holistic view of concepts, and much of the inconclusiveness of that debate derives from the lack of any clear understanding of what a conceptual system is, or of how conceptual systems confer meaning on their terms
|Keywords||Change Concept Language Science Sellars, W|
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Citations of this work BETA
Stephane Savanah (2012). The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):713-720.
Nancy J. Nersessian (2005). Abstraction Via Generic Modeling in Concept Formation in Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):117-144.
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