David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 39 (1):20-31 (1972)
In this paper, I consider a variety of objections against the covering-law model of scientific explanation, show that Aristotle was already aware of them and had solutions for them, and argue that these solutions are correct. These solutions involve the notions of nonHumean causality and of essential properties. There are a great many familiar objections, both methodological and epistemological, to introducing these concepts into the methodology of science, but I show that these objections are based upon misunderstandings of these concepts
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George Botterill (2010). Two Kinds of Causal Explanation. Theoria 76 (4):287-313.
Christopher Norris (1997). Ontological Relativity and Meaning-Variance: A Critical-Constructive Review. Inquiry 40 (2):139 – 173.
Paolo Mancosu (1992). Aristotelian Logic and Euclidean Mathematics: Seventeenth-Century Developments of the Quaestio de Certitudine Mathematicarum. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (2):241-265.
Paolo Mancosu (1991). On the Status of Proofs by Contradiction in the Seventeenth Century. Synthese 88 (1):15 - 41.
Berent Enç (1986). Essentialism Without Individual Essences: Causation, Kinds, Supervenience, and Restricted Identities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):403-426.
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