The but not all: A partitive account of plural definite descriptions

Mind and Language 22 (4):402–426 (2007)
Abstract
A number of authors in favor of a unitary account of singular descriptions have alleged that the unitary account can be extrapolated to account for plural definite descriptions. In this paper I take a closer look at this suggestion. I argue that while the unitary account is clearly onto something right, it is in the end empirically inadequate. At the end of the paper I offer a new partitive account of plural definite descriptions that avoids the problems with both the unitary account and standard Russellian analyses.
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References found in this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2007). Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):117 – 136.
Berit Brogaard (2007). Sharvy's Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):160–180.
Alice Drewery (2005). The Logical Form of Universal Generalizations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):373 – 393.

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Citations of this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.
Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.
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