David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons. Two of these views I call “Atomism” and “Wholism”. Atomism is the view that atomic reasons are fundamental: all reasons reduce to atomic reasons. Wholism is the view that whole reasons are fundamental. I argue for Wholism, and against Atomism. I also consider whether reasons might be “context-sensitive”
|Keywords||Reasons Mereology Atomism Wholism Additivism Marginalism Isolationism|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Thomas J. McKay (2006). Plural Predication. Oxford University Press.
Sean D. McKeever (2006). Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford University Press.
Michael Ridge (2007). Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
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