The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access

Analysis 55 (3):149-56 (1995)
In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use Burge's commitment to these entailments to show that his antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access
Keywords Dependence  Epistemology  Individualism  Mckinsey, M
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DOI 10.1093/analys/55.3.149
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Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged Access to the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.

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