Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 55 (3):149-56 (1995)
|Abstract||In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use Burge's commitment to these entailments to show that his antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access|
|Keywords||Dependence Epistemology Individualism Mckinsey, M|
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