David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 55 (3):149-56 (1995)
In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use Burge's commitment to these entailments to show that his antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access
|Keywords||Dependence Epistemology Individualism Mckinsey, M|
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Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged Access to the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.
Ted Parent (2015). Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):158-168.
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