Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):831-832 (1999)
|Abstract||Logical problems inherent in claims that biological neuroscience can ultimately explain mind are not anomalous: They result from underlying social interests. Neuroscientists are currently making a successful bid to fill a vacuum of authority created by the demise of Freudian theory in popular culture. The conflations described in the Gold & Stoljar target article are the result of alliances between certain apologist-philosophers, neuroscientists, and institutions, for the purpose of commanding authority and resources. Social analysis has a role to play in addressing logical issues in the philosophy of neuroscience.|
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