The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Richard Brown, The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2008). Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
Richard Brown (2006). What is a Brain State? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.

View all 15 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2008). Does Phenomenology Overflow Access? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):29-38.
David Rosenthal (2007). Phenomenological Overflow and Cognitive Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):522-523.
Peter Carruthers (2003). Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
David M. Rosenthal (1993). Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.
John O'Dea (2007). A Higher-Order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):29-41.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-06-05

Total downloads

174 ( #3,398 of 1,096,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

23 ( #4,714 of 1,096,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.