Graduate studies at Western
Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124 (2007)
|Abstract||The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character is had by the content of the thought; others argue that it belongs to the attitude type itself. I examine the two answers and argue that the quality of thought is best understood as taking a qualitative mental attitude towards some representational content. Each propositional attitude is distinguished by a unique quality and it is having that quality with respect to the content that makes it a belief, fear (etc.) that p.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Theodore W. Schick (1992). The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):383-93.
Berit Brogaard (2007). Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap? Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
Danilo Dantas (2009). What (and How) Was I Thinking?: On Memory of Past Thoughts. Intuitio 2 (2):103-107.
York H. Gunther (2001). Content, Illusion, Partition. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.
Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). The Supervenience of Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.
Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads112 ( #6,260 of 739,359 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,616 of 739,359 )
How can I increase my downloads?