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- Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.In the Standard Model of the Mind currently employed in cognitive science we have corresponding to thought and sense two distinct kinds of properties: intentional and qualitative. On the one hand we have qualitative states, which are generally agreed to be those states which there is ‘something that it is like’ for the subject that has them; I will say that these states have a quality. On the other hand we have intentional states, which have the property of being about something, called intentionality, and which lack a quality. There is nothing that it is like to have intentional states. According to the Standard Model all mental phenomena have one or another, or both, of these properties. There are some mental phenomena that are purely qualitative (perhaps sensations and their sensory qualities) and some that are purely intentional (thoughts) and still others that are a mix of both (perceptions and emotions). Of course, there are those who resist the Standard Model, drawn as they are to the siren song of a single mark of the mental.In my reading list | Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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