The new Riddle of causation

Abstract
We commonly distinguish causes from mere conditions, for example by saying that the strike caused the match to light but by failing to mention the presence of oxygen. Philosophers from Mill to Lewis have dismissed this common practice as irrelevant to the philosophical analysis of causation. In this paper, however, I argue that causal selection poses a puzzle of just the same form as Hume's sceptical challenge to the notion of necessary connection. I then propose a solution in terms of a simple counterfactual.
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