The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth
In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press (2008)
| Abstract | Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible ways to refute it. I will then argue that two of these are unsuccessful, and defend the third, which involves denying that there are any genuinely relative truths. | |||||||||
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