Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839 (2014)
Abstract
Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science
Keywords values in science  inductive risk  underdetermination
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References found in this work BETA
Justin Biddle (2013). State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kevin C. Elliott (2013). Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
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Ernan McMullin (1995). Underdetermination. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (3):233-252.
Deborah G. Mayo (1988). Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:489 - 503.
Heather Douglas (2014). The Value of Cognitive Values. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
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