Why counterpossibles are non-trivial

In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), Synthese volume (forthcoming)
I. Non-Trivial Counterpossibles On Lewis’ account, a subjunctive of the form ‘if it were the case that p, it would be the case that q’ (represented as ‘p → q’) is to be given the following rough meta-linguistic truth-conditions1.
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Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Barak Krakauer (2013). What Are Impossible Worlds? Philosophical Studies 165 (3):989-1007.
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