What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh

Abstract Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that “s knows-wh” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause.” Anti-reductionists hold that “s knows-wh” is reducible to “s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a spccial kind of de re knowledge
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