Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439-467 (2009)
|Abstract||Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that “s knows-wh” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause.” Anti-reductionists hold that “s knows-wh” is reducible to “s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a spccial kind of de re knowledge|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Dunja Jutronić (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):193-197.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383–403.
Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439-467.
Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.) (2007). Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads78 ( #10,432 of 556,802 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,255 of 556,802 )
How can I increase my downloads?