Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327 (2005)
|Abstract||According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues that some of our intuitions about the cases are explained by the former factor and some by the latter. I argue that psychological bias is the more fundamental of these elements. I show how, by itself, psychological bias can explain all the intuitions concerning contextualist cases. Further, it gives the best account of why contextualist cases are characterized by a failure of luminosity|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Baumann (2008). Contextualism and the Factivity Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580–602.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Contextualist Theories of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.
Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Murali Ramachandran (2009). Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.
Christoph Kelp (2012). Do 'Contextualist Cases' Support Contextualism? Erkenntnis 76 (1):115-120.
Jessica Brown (2005). Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #40,850 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?