Wide or narrow scope?

Mind 116 (462):359-370 (2007)
This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm359
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Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Niko Kolodny (2008). The Myth of Practical Consistency. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Sam Shpall (2014). Moral and Rational Commitment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.

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