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- Bryson Brown (1999). Yes, Virginia, There Really Are Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):489-500.B. H. Slater has argued that there cannot be any truly paraconsistent logics, because it's always more plausible to suppose whatever negation symbol is used in the language is not a real negation, than to accept the paraconsistent reading. In this paper I neither endorse nor dispute Slater's argument concerning negation; instead, my aim is to show that as an argument against paraconsistency, it misses (some of) the target. A important class of paraconsistent logics — the preservationist logics — are not subject to this objection. In addition I show that if we identify logics by means of consequence relations, at least one dialetheic logic can be reinterpreted in preservationist (non-dialetheic) terms. Thus the interest of paraconsistent consequence relations — even those that emerge from dialetheic approaches — does not depend on the tenability of dialetheism. Of course, if dialetheism is defensible, then paraconsistent logic will be required to cope with it. But the existence (and interest) of paraconsistent logics does not depend on a defense of dialetheism.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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in models. We show that these natural preferential In the research on paraconsistency, preferential systems systems that were originally designed for paraconwere used for constructing logics which are paraconsistent sistent reasoning fulfill a key condition (stopperedbut stronger than substructural paraconsistent logics. The ness or smoothness) from the theoretical research preferences in these systems were defined in different ways. of nonmonotonic reasoning. Consequently, the Some were based on checking which abnormal formulas nonmonotonic consequence relations that they in-.
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| | Scholar | More options ... The Logics of Deontic (In)Consistency (LDI's) can be considered as the deontic counterpart of the paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal (In)Consistency. This paper introduces and studies new LDI's and other paraconsistent deontic logics with different properties: systems tolerant to contradictory obligations; systems in which contradictory obligations trivialize; and a bimodal paraconsistent deontic logic combining the features of previous systems. These logics are used to analyze the well-known Chisholm's paradox, taking profit of the fact that, besides contradictory obligations do not trivialize in LDI's, several logical dependencies of classical logic are blocked in the context of LDI's, allowing to dissolve the paradox.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper we consider the theory of predicate logics in which the principle of Bivalence or the principle of Non-Contradiction or both fail. Such logics are partial or paraconsistent or both. We consider sequent calculi for these logics and prove Model Existence. For L4, the most general logic under consideration, we also prove a version of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Theorem. The paper shows that many techniques used for classical predicate logic generalise to partial and paraconsistent logics once the right set-up is chosen. Our logic L4 has a semantics that also underlies Belnap’s [4] and is related to the logic of bilattices. L4 is in focus most of the time, but it is also shown how results obtained for L4 can be transferred to several variants.
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| | Other links: projecteuclid.org:80 dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... As is known, a logic S is paraconsistent if the rule ECQ (E contradictione quodlibet) is not a rule of S. Not less well known is the fact that Lewis’ modal logics are not paraconsistent. Actually, Lewis vindicates the validity of ECQ in a famous proof currently known as the “Lewis’ proof” or “Lewis’ argument.” This proof essentially leans on the Disjunctive Syllogism as a rule of inference. The aim of this paper is to define a series of paraconsistent logics included in S4 where the Disjunctive Syllogism is valid only as a rule of proof.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... As is known, a logic S is paraconsistent if the rule ECQ (E contradictione quodlibet) is not a rule of S. Not less well known is the fact that Lewis’ modal logics are not paraconsistent. Actually, Lewis vindicates the validity of ECQ in a famous proof currently known as the “Lewis’ proof” or “Lewis’ argument.” This proof essentially leans on the Disjunctive Syllogism as a rule of inference. The aim of this paper is to define a series of paraconsistent logics included in S4 where the Disjunctive Syllogism is valid only as a rule of proof.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The idea that the phenomenon of vagueness might be modelled by a paraconsistent logic has been little discussed in contemporary work on vagueness, just as the idea that paraconsistent logics might be fruitfully applied to the phenomenon of vagueness has been little discussed in contemporary work on paraconsistency. This is prima facie surprising given that the earliest formalisations of paraconsistent logics presented in Ja´skowski (1948) and Halldén (1949) were presented as logics of vagueness. One possible explanation for this is that, despite initial advocacy by pioneers of paraconsistency, the prospects for a paraconsistent account of vagueness are so poor as to warrant little further consideration. In this paper we look at the reasons that might be offered in defence of this negative claim. As we shall show, they are far from compelling. Paraconsistent accounts of vagueness deserve further attention.
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| | Scholar | More options ... We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In positive logic the negation of a propositionA is defined byA X whereX is some fixed proposition. A number of standard properties of negation, includingreductio ad absurdum, can then be proved, but not the law of noncontradiction so that this forms a paraconsistent logic. Various stronger paraconsistent logics are then generated by putting in particular propositions forX. These propositions range from true through contingent to false.
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| | Other links: jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... “Paraconsistent” means “beyond the consistent” [3, 15]. Paraconsistent logics tolerate inconsistencies in a way that traditional logics do not. In a paraconsistent logic, the inference of explosion A, ∼AB is rejected. This may be for any of a number of reasons [16]. For proponents of relevance [1, 2] the argument has gone awry when we infer an irrelevant B from the inconsistent premises. Those who argue that inconsistent theories may have some logical content but do not commit us to everything, have reason to think that these theories are closed under a relation of paraconsistent logical consequence [12, 18]. Another reason to adopt a paraconsistent logic is more extreme. You may take the world to be inconsistent [14], and a true theory incorporating this inconsistency must be governed by a paraconsistent logic.
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| | Other links: projecteuclid.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The aim of this paper is to show that Graham Priest's dialetheic account of semantic paradoxes and the paraconsistent logics employed cannot achieve semantic universality. Dialetheism therefore fails as a solution to semantic paradoxes for the same reason that consistent approaches did. It will be demonstrated that if dialetheism can express its own semantic principles, a strengthened liar paradox will result, which renders dialetheism trivial. In particular, the argument is not invalidated by relational valuations, which were brought into paraconsistent logic in order to avoid strengthened liar paradoxes.
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| | Other links: mind.oupjournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Bryson Brown, Yes, Virginia, there really are paraconsistent logics
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