Are intentions reasons?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444 (2007)
This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in tie-break situations.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00301.x
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Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising-Part 1. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.

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