A note on theories for quasi-inductive definitions

Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):684-699 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper introduces theories for arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (Burgess, 1986) as it has been done for first-order monotone and nonmonotone inductive ones. After displaying the basic axiomatic framework, we provide some initial result in the proof theoretic bounds line of research (the upper one being given in terms of a theory of sets extending Kripke–Platek set theory)

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2009-12-31

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Citations of this work

Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.

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References found in this work

The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
Constructibility.Keith J. Devlin - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (3):864-867.

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