Consequentialism and the wrong kind of reasons: A reply to Lang

Utilitas 22 (3):351-359 (2010)
Abstract
In his article , Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected
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References found in this work BETA
Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.

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