Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism

Analysis 61 (3):187-193 (2001)
In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind  Possibility  Chalmers, D
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00293
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