Hinge propositions and epistemic justification

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287 (2007)
Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00292.x
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Allan Hazlett (2006). How to Defeat Belief in the External World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.

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