If I am a brain in a vat, then I am not a brain in a vat
Mind 101 (401):123-128 (1992)
| Abstract | Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty. | |||||||||
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