Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140 (2012)
Abstract
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements
Keywords Instrumental rationality  Rational requirements  Symmetry  Wide-scope  Narrow-scope
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John Broome (2002). Practical Reasoning. In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press. 85--111.

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