David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140 (2012)
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements
|Keywords||Instrumental rationality Rational requirements Symmetry Wide-scope Narrow-scope|
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Citations of this work BETA
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2016). Understanding Conditionalization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):767-797.
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2015). How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement From Wide-Scope Requirements. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.
Alex Worsnip (2015). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
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