David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140 (2012)
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements
|Keywords||Instrumental rationality Rational requirements Symmetry Wide-scope Narrow-scope|
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End‐Given Conditionals. Ethics 119 (4):672-698.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
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John Broome (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.
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Citations of this work BETA
Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
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