Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world

Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343 (1994)
In "Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism,"' Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens argue that externalism with respect to mental content does not engender skepticism about knowledge of content. They go on to argue that even when externalism is freed from epistemological difficulties, the thesis cannot be used against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world. I would like to raise some questions about these claims.
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Knowledge  World  Falvey, K  Owens, J
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DOI 10.2307/2185740
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Hamid Vahid (2003). Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388.
Sarah Sawyer (2001). The Epistemic Divide. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):385-401.

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