Moore inferences
Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):366-369 (1998)
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Anthony Brueckner (2009). More on Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 69 (3):497-499.
Anthony Brueckner (2006). Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 66 (291):264–266.
Philip Stratton-Lake & Brad Hooker (2006). Scanlon Versus Moore on Goodness. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
John Greco (2002). How to Reid Moore. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
Heath White (2006). Desires in Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):197 - 221.
Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
Carlo Cellucci (2006). The Question Hume Didn't Ask: Why Should We Accept Deductive Inferences? In Carlo Cellucci & Paolo Pecere (eds.), Demonstrative and Non-Demonstrative Reasoning in Mathematics and Natural Science, pp. 137-165. Edizioni dell'Università di Cassino.
Paul Arthur Schilpp (1952). The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York, Tudor Pub. Co..
Martin Smith (2009). Transmission Failure Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.
F. C. T. Moore (1990). Rome Inferences and Structural Opacity. Mind 99 (396):601-608.
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