On “Epistemic Permissiveness”

Synthese 188 (2):165-177 (2012)
In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ~P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed
Keywords Epistemology  Rationality  Permissiveness  Uniqueness  Roger White
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9921-9
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References found in this work BETA
Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

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Citations of this work BETA
Christopher Michael Cloos (2015). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
Kevin McCain (2013). Two Skeptical Arguments or Only One? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.

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