On “Epistemic Permissiveness”

Synthese 188 (2):165-177 (2012)
Abstract
In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ~P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed
Keywords Epistemology  Rationality  Permissiveness  Uniqueness  Roger White
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    References found in this work BETA
    Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Kevin McCain (2013). Two Skeptical Arguments or Only One? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.
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