One more failed transcendental argument
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):633-636 (1993)
| Abstract | In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism," Douglas C. Long presents a transcendental argument against epistemological skepticism.' The argument has a distinctively Kantian flavor (though Long does not highlight this connection), in that it proceeds from the premise that I have self-knowledge and ends with the conclusion that I have perceptual knowledge of an objective, material subject of mental states. If the skeptic wishes to accept the transcendental argument's premise (as he seems to do), then he must reject his claim that I lack knowledge of all propositions concerning my physical nature, history and environment. The falsity of this skeptical claim is a condition for the possibility of self-knowledge, according to Long's transcendental argument. In this paper, I would like to see whether the argument is really work-able. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1989). Another Failed Transcendental Argument. Noûs 23 (4):525-530.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
Bryan Baird (2006). The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):381-398.
Adrian Bardon (2005). Performative Transcendental Arguments. Philosophia 33 (1-4):69-95.
Robert Stern (2008). Kant's Response to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (2008). The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Transcendental Arguments II. Noûs 18 (2):197-225.
Anthony Brueckner (1996). Modest Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):265-280.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1983). Transcendental Arguments I. Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads25 ( #50,393 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |

