Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29 (2013)
One version of the desire satisfaction theory of well-being (i.e., welfare, or what is good for one) holds that only the satisfaction of one's present desires for present states of affairs can affect one's well-being. So if I desire fame today and become famous tomorrow, my well-being is positively affected onlyif tomorrow, when I am famous, I still desire to be famous. Call this the present desire satisfaction theory of well-being. I argue, contrary to this theory, that the satisfaction of past desires that are no longer held does indeed affect one's well-being. The satisfaction of past desires is good for one in that the present satisfaction of past desires positively affects one's past well-being. I argue for this view in stages, starting with the recognition that many of our desires are satisfied not at an instant but over an interval of time, and that it is during this interval of time that our well-being is positively affected. Once we get our foot in the door with some temporal thickness to desire satisfaction and the associated well-being, I argue, the door must open more widely to allow for greater temporal distance between present desire satisfaction and past well-being. I defend my thesis that present satisfaction of past desires increases one's past welfare against objections, including the claim that it involves backward causation and Velleman's claim that the view is highly counterintuitive whether or not it involves backward causation. I argue that some of the objections rely on hedonistic intuitions, intuitions that most desire satisfaction theories of welfare aim to correct. Once properly understood and applied, my counterintuitive and controversial thesis is really quite innocuous.
Keywords well-being  Velleman  desire satisfaction  desire  welfare
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.632016
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism About Well‐Being. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.

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