Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22 (1993)
|Abstract||Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.|
|Keywords||Epistemology Identity Indeterminacy Language Parfit, D|
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