Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism
Synthese 162 (2):167–171 (2008)
| Abstract | E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman. | |||||||||
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