Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism

Synthese 162 (2):167–171 (2008)
Abstract
E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
Keywords Closure  Skepticism
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References found in this work BETA
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.

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