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- Anthony Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.
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Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims have to be compatible with being fallible. Thus any knowledge claim is capable of being doubted.
Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
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