David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):349-364 (2011)
It is commonly recognized that not all actions are candidates for moral evaluation. For instance, morality is silent on the issue whether to tie one's right shoe before one's left shoe or the other way around. This shoe-tying action is not a candidate for moral appraisal. The matter is amoral, for neither alternative is morally required nor forbidden, and both are permissible. It is not commonly recognized that not all actions are candidates for prudential evaluation. I shall argue, however, that there are cases of individual action over time, as well, that are aprudent in the sense that none of the alternatives under consideration are required or forbidden by prudence, but all of them are permissible. These are cases in which there is no fact of the matter as to what is the best choice for one. There are at least two such cases: first, cases in which the alternative courses of action open to one are incommensurable; and second, cases in which one's values are not yet determined and one is deciding what values to adopt, what sort of person to become, or what ideals to pursue. In these cases, prudence is silent on the question of what one ought to do. Indeed, I go on to argue prudence can even be silent on the question whether to act according to the values one currently holds or to pursue an entirely different course that will result in changes to one's values, which is the third case of aprudent choice
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
Joseph Raz (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
John Rawls (2009/2005). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Citations of this work BETA
Donald W. Bruckner (2012). Against the Tedium of Immortality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):623-644.
Jan Bransen (2015). Self-Knowledge and Self-Love. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):309-321.
Donald Bruckner (2011). Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality. Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385.
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