Self-knowledge via inner observation of external objects?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122 (2003)
Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Observation  Self-knowledge  Thought  Langsam, H
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DOI 10.1080/713659568
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