Transcendental arguments II

Noûs 18 (2):197-225 (1984)
In part I of the present work, I used the term 'Kantian transcendental argument' to refer to any argument which purports to establish that the existence of outer objects is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. In this second part, then, I examine Kantian transcendental arguments which proceed from the premise that one is the subject of widely construed self-conscious experience.
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DOI 10.2307/2215161
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Mark Sacks (2005). The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.
John J. Callanan (2006). Kant's Transcendental Strategy. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.

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