Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 55 (3):146-48 (1995)
|Abstract||This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism|
|Keywords||Dependence Epistemology Individualism Metaphysics Mckinsey, M|
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