Online research in philosophy

The two competitive currents in French philosophy initiated by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze tackle the difference between empiricism and idealism in contrary motion. In Derrida, the move is toward a critique of representation. In Deleuze, it is toward recovery of the real. Nevertheless, this paper nominates their meeting in a kind of 'radical empiricism'. Both Derrida and Deleuze engage with empiricism at certain points in their work, although many who go by that label would be surprised to hear it.

Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn''t be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will argue that there is nothing in Derrida''s philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze''s work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming.

This paper approaches the problem of the relation between Deleuze and Derrida by focusing on their respective readings of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return. It argues that the difference between Deleuze and Derrida cannot be measured in terms of their explicit statements about Heidegger, but in terms of how they relate their own readings of Nietzsche to Heidegger's positioning of him as the last metaphysician. The paper focuses on Deleuze's brief analyses of Heidegger in Difference and Repetition and Derrida's numerous references to the eternal return throughout his oeuvre, particularly in the essay Différance. I argue that Deleuze and Derrida articulate two different relations to the simulacrum through the way in which they position their own work in relation to Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche.

This paper offers a comparative analysis of the uses and formulations of speech-act theory in Derrida's and Deleuze/Guattari's work. It begins by juxtaposing Derrida's concept/nonconcept of 'iterability' to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the 'order-word' and then examines these theories of the speech act in terms of their implications and consequences for a politics of resistance. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari generate a detailed material stratum — an order-word plateau — for exploring the performative in socio-political contexts, Derrida attends to the singular, wholly unique acts that occur when a repeatable formula such as a political declaration is uttered or otherwise takes place.The paper then concludes by drawing a tentative link between iterability and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'deterritorialisation' via the order-word plateau.

This paper points to significant similarities between the political orientations of Deleuze and Derrida. Derrida's appeal to a pure form of existing concepts (absolute hospitality, pure forgiveness, and so on) parallels Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between relative and absolute 'deterritorialisation'. In each case, the absolute form of the concept is a condition of the possibility of change.

This paper compares the "future politics", and the philosophies of time, of Derrida and Deleuze.