A uniqueness theorem for 'no collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics

Abstract
We prove a uniqueness theorem showing that, subject to certain natural constraints, all 'no collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics can be uniquely characterized and reduced to the choice of a particular preferred observable as determine (definite, sharp). We show how certain versions of the modal interpretation, Bohm's 'causal' interpretation, Bohr's complementarity interpretation, and the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation without the projection postulate can be recovered from the theorem. Bohr's complementarity and Einstein's realism appear as two quite different proposals for selecting the preferred determinate observable--either settled pragmatically by what we choose to observe, or fixed once and for all, as the Einsteinian realist would require, in which case the preferred observable is a 'beable' in Bell's sense, as in Bohm's interpretation (where the preferred observable is position in configuration space).
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Dennis Dieks (2007). Probability in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):292-310.
    Armond Duwell (2008). Quantum Information Does Exist. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (1):195-216.
    P. Busch (2002). Classical Versus Quantum Ontology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 33 (3):517-539.
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