David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190 (2004)
ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The consequences of the distinction between belief and acceptance, and the model of belief control sketched are then applied to the recent case made by Carl Ginet in defense of the conceptual and psychological possibility of agents exercising direct voluntary control over their beliefs. n.
|Keywords||Acceptance Belief Epistemology Voluntarism Ginet, C|
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Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott (2015). Introduction: Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2005). How (Not) to Think About Mental Action. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
Rik Peels (2013). Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility. Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency. Theoria 77 (4):312-332.
John Zeis (2013). Holding the Faith True. Res Philosophica 90 (2):161-170.
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