David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 77 (4):312-332 (2011)
In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am interested in the implications for thinking about the variety of evaluative control we can exercise over the formation of our doxastic attitudes. I show that our assumptions about how to individuate actions matters for how we think about doxastic agency and, hence, the conclusions we reach about action-individuation are of greater significance than some have thought
|Keywords||doxastic voluntarism action‐individuation mental agency agency mental action doxastic agency action belief|
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References found in this work BETA
Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele (1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
John Bishop (1990). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge University Press.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
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