Are truth and reference quasi-disquotational?

Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75 (2003)
In a number of influential papers, Hartry Field has advanced an account of truth and reference that we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disputation and facts about what constitute a good translation into our language. Field suggeststhat we might view quasi-disquotationalism as either (a) an analysis of our ordinary truth-theoretic concepts of reference and truth, or (b) an account of certain other concepts that improve upon our ordinary concepts. In this paper, I argue that (i) if the view is understood along the lines of (a)it fails, and (ii) if it is construed along the lines of (b) it is, at best, under-motivated.
Keywords truth  deflationism  reference  disquotationalism
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