Can it be Rational to have Faith?
In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
| Abstract | This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence. | |||||||||
| Keywords | belief epistemic rationality evidence evidence-gathering expected utility faith I.J. Good practical rationality rationality | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDaniel J. Mckaughan (2013). Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk: Dissolving the Problem of Faith and Reason. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 49 (1):101-124.
Lara Buchak (2010). Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
John Zeis (2006). Evidentialism and Faith. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:185-200.
Robert Audi (1995). Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the Rationality of Religious Commitment. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:1-18.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Reed Richter (1990). Ideal Rationality and Hand Waving. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008). The Virtue of Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
Ram Neta (2008). What Evidence Do You Have? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-06-21Total downloads103 ( #6,010 of 556,888 )Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #5,197 of 556,888 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
