Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114 (2006)
|Abstract||I critique Matthias Steupâs account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steupâs theory of doxastic agency may have for epistemic deontologism|
|Keywords||doxastic voluntarism doxastic attitudes action agency epistemic deontology epistemic justification|
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