Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. One way to justify the truth condition in an analysis of knowledge is by appeal to the linguistic thesis that the word 'know' is factive. But does this principle reflect actual usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that non-philosophers sometimes use 'know' in what appear to be non-factive ways, suggesting that the folk concept of knowledge is nonfactive. Presented here however, is a rival explanatory hypothesis for these linguistic practices. The results of four experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks suggest that many seemingly non-factive uses of 'know' are better explained by a factive concept--together with a phenomenon known as protagonist projection--than by an ordinary concept that allows for knowledge under false belief. Thus it is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the factivity of knowledge withstands current empirical scrutiny.|
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