Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection

Episteme 11 (4):391-409 (2014)
Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands current empirical scrutiny.
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2014.22
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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