Gettier Made ESEE

Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):368-383 (2013)
Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But should epistemologists care? The present set of studies demonstrate that this basic effect can be extended to overturn intuitions in some of the most theoretically central experiments in contemporary epistemology: Gettier cases. Furthermore, experiment three shows that this effect is unlikely mediated by a simple desire to blame, suggesting that a correct psychological account of ordinary knowledge attribution may include moral judgment.
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2012.730965
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Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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