How (not) to think about mental action

Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89 (2005)
Abstract
I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.
Keywords Intention  Mental Act  Metaphysics  Trying  Strawson, G
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