Graduate studies at Western
Philosophers' Imprint 12 (1) (2012)
|Abstract||According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of belief-reports fails, there ispressure to give up the metaphysical thesis that belief is apropositional attitude. I conclude by suggesting that we allownon-propositional entities to be amongst the relata of thebelief-relation, and make some speculative remarks concerning whatsuch entities might be like|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Delia Graff Fara (2013). Specifying Desires. Noûs 47 (2):250-272.
Tom Stoneham (1998). On Believing That I Am Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
Friederike Moltmann (2003). Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions. Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.
Maite Ezcurdia (2004). Pragmatic Attitudes and Semantic Competence (Actitudes Pragmáticas y Competencia Semántica). Crítica 36 (108):55 - 82.
Rik Peels (2012). The New View on Ignorance Undefeated. Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Nathan Salmon (2006). The Resilience of Illogical Belief. Noûs 40 (2):369–375.
Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.
Katarzyna Jaszczolt (1999). Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Elsevier.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). Propositional Faith: What It is and What It is Not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.
Emar Maier (2004). Acquaintance Resolution and Belief de Re. In Laura Alonso i Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.
Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2003). Believing in Things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
Added to index2012-02-09
Total downloads101 ( #7,783 of 751,740 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #15,067 of 751,740 )
How can I increase my downloads?