David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289 (2012)
One recent trend in contemporary epistemology is to study the way in which the concept of knowledge is actually applied in everyday settings. This approach has inspired an exciting new spirit of collaboration between experimental philosophers and traditional epistemologists, who have begun using the techniques of the social sciences to investigate the factors that influence ordinary judgments about knowledge attribution. This paper provides an overview of some of the results these researchers have uncovered, suggesting that in addition to traditionally considered factors like evidence and justification, a number of important non-truth-conducive factors play significant roles in determining when people ascribe knowledge. The present review focuses on four non-traditional factors: pragmatic load (in relation to contextualism and interest-relative invariantism), moral judgment, performance errors, and demographic variation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan Weinberg (2010). Competence: What's In? What's Out? Who Knows? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):329-330.
Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
Mark Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom (2011). Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control. Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):670-696.
Kent Bach (2010). Knowledge in and Out of Context. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Mit Press. 105--36.
James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
Citations of this work BETA
Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman (2012). The Folk Conception of Knowledge. Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman (2013). Taking 'Know' for an Answer: A Reply to Nagel, San Juan, and Mar. Cognition 129 (3):662-665.
Similar books and articles
Keith Lehrer (2000). Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press.
Wesley Buckwalter (2013). Gettier Made ESEE. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-16.
N. Ángel Pinillos (forthcoming). Knowledge, Experiments and Practical Interests. In Jessica Brown & MIkkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays On Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Sylvanus Ifeanyi Nnoruka (2003). Judgement in African Thought. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):51-61.
Wesley Buckwalter (2010). Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
Steffen Borge (2008). Stanley on the Knowledge-Relation. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):109-124.
Abdullah Kaygi (2006). Value-Judgements and Values. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:97-102.
Stephen R. Grimm (2011). On Intellectualism in Epistemology. Mind 120 (479):705-733.
Mark Phelan (2013). Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
Hanno Sauer (2012). Morally Irrelevant Factors: What's Left of the Dual Process-Model of Moral Cognition? Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.
V. Villa (1997). Legal Theory and Value Judgments. Law and Philosophy 16 (4):447-477.
Chandra Sripada (2012). Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect Effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):232-238.
Keith Lehrer (1988). Met Aknowledge: Undefeated Justification. Synthese 74 (3):329 - 347.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.
Added to index2011-11-08
Total downloads128 ( #7,254 of 1,102,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #7,494 of 1,102,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?