David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):185-196 (1999)
Donald Davidson has posed the problem of first-person authority and provided his own solution to it. He has argued that no epistemic theory of first-person authority can resolve the problem, but that a theory that appeals to constraints on interpreting speech can. We argue that Davidson is wrong about epistemic theories and that his own theory of first-person authority is inadequate. We propose an alternative based on the epistemic constraints associated with embodiment and argue that recognition of these constraints undermines Davidson's position
|Keywords||Authority Epistemology Mind Self-knowledge Davidson, D|
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