Self-knowledge and embodiment

Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):185-196 (1999)
Abstract
Donald Davidson has posed the problem of first-person authority and provided his own solution to it. He has argued that no epistemic theory of first-person authority can resolve the problem, but that a theory that appeals to constraints on interpreting speech can. We argue that Davidson is wrong about epistemic theories and that his own theory of first-person authority is inadequate. We propose an alternative based on the epistemic constraints associated with embodiment and argue that recognition of these constraints undermines Davidson's position
Keywords Authority  Epistemology  Mind  Self-knowledge  Davidson, D
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