Surviving resurrection

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.
Keywords Resurrection  Personal identity  Persons  Constitution  Lynne Rudder Baker  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.

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