Justifying and Exploring Realistic Monism

Abstract
The foundations of mathematics and physics no longer start with fundamental entities and their properties like spatial extension, points, lines or the billiard ball like particles of Newtonian physics. Mathematics has abolished these from its foundations in set theory by making all assumptions explicit and structural. Particle physics has become completely mathematical, connecting to physical reality only through experimental technique. Applying the principles guiding the foundations of mathematics and physics to philosophical analysis underscores that only conscious experience has an intrinsic nature. This leads to a version of realistic monism in which the essence and totality of the existence of physical structure is immediate experience in some form. Identifying physical structure with conscious experience allows the application of mathematics to the evolution of consciousness. Some of the implications from Goedel’s Incompleteness Theorem are connected to creativity and ethics.
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